HUMANS
IN THE WORLD: INTRODUCTION
TO RADICAL PERSPECTIVISM
HUMANS
IN THE WORLD: INTRODUCTION
TO RADICAL PERSPECTIVISM
Other Chapters:
Alexander Makedon
Chicago State University
Copyright © 1992
If by "ethics" is meant a theory of conduct, then according to perspectivist ethics, there can be no theory without certain fundamental ethical assumptions. For example, ethical theories may differ in their definitions of what counts as good, worth pursuing, or desirable. It follows that something (another theory, event, or feeling) is "ethical" only from the perspective of its ethical assumptions. In other words, a system of ethics is no more ethical than the "first" assumptions" that underlie it, which collectively may be seen as its ethical "perspective."
The underlying ethical assumptions in a theory inevitably define not only its own desirability, but also the degree to which other theories are desirable by comparison to its first assumptions. Presumably, a theory of ethics is ethical not only because it has a moral code, but also reasons for why one should follow this, rather than that, type of conduct. Yet even its "reasons" are built on certain "first assumptions" that are inevitably atomic, culture-centered, or universal (see chapter on First Assumptions).
Logically there can be no theory that can be "better" than another, except from inside the perspective of any one of the theories examined. For example, what may be ethical from the perspective of a certain individual, may not be from the perspective of other parts of the world, such as, individuals living in other cultures, or other animate or inanimate world-parts. This is so because we can imagine that each world part may have different first assumptions about the world, including ways of "living" it, and therefore different views of what is desirable.
A theory which claims to have a meta-ethical theory of ethics that explains, evaluates, or classifies all the others may be seen from a different ethical perspective as neither meta-ethical, nor even good, but simply "different." Ironically, it is this diversity of ethical possibilities in the world which allows each one of these theories to exist, in the first place, and therefore ultimately the one thing which no theory can destroy without bringing about its own demise. In fact, even an ethical theory which advocates the destruction of the world could not possibly exist without a world to destroy, in the first place, and therefore also depends on the world for its existence. A perspectivist view of ethics thus leads us to the view that for a theory to be ethical, in the sense of being possible even to come to be, there must first exist a world that makes such theory possible.
Radically Perspectivistic Ethics
By "world-perspective" the author means the perspective which humans can imagine other world parts may have about ethics, some of which may at first seem contradictory, mutually inconsistent, or opposed to human-centered ethical beliefs. Ultimately, to be truly ethical, meaning, to be possible even to think ethically, humans must be open to the world as a whole, including expanding a world diversity of mutually non-destructive ethical perspectives. This is so because without the world, there can be no-thing to be ethical about. Since the world is its diversity, ethics is inextricably linked with the preservation of the world's diversity.
It may argued that, to paraphrase Jean Paul Sartre, one needs the nothingness that his imagination creates in the midst of being to evaluate the desirability of present actions from a perspective that he has imagined, but never really found anywhere else except in his imagination. Yet the nothingness of a non-world is not like the nothingness in the midst of being in Sartre's psychology, but total nothingness in the midst of nothingness. Such total nothingness is unimaginable, and therefore even on existential grounds impossible to be ethical about. Unlike the existential ethics of imagination which allows at least something to surround the nothingness of our human imagination, and therefore to center it, and subsequently project it inside being as a possible "social project," a non-existing nothingness is unimaginable because even surrounding its own nothingness is nothing, and therefore cannot even be "centered," imagined, or projected. Without a world, or the ethical diversity which such world implies, all ethics melts away into an undefinable, uncentered, or unperspectivistic non-world-view that means nothing.
A world perspective demands that far from the extinction of opposing ethical viewpoints, we must promote an ever increasing diversity of interdependent ethical views. In the end, the underlying ontology of ethical beliefs requires that we not only welcome the dialectics of our ethical opponents, but even help them co-exist peacefully with our own. This is so because an ethic can rise as "ethical" only in the context of those ethical theories that oppose it, which by contrast to such an ethic may be seen as "unethical." Thus a radically perspectivistic ethic may be seen as the universal meta-ethics of all ethical beliefs equally considered, role-played, or imagined.
What is the difference between ethics and morality? There are numerous definitions of the two terms "ethics" and "morality," none of which meets with everyone's unanimous acceptance. If by "ethics" is meant those reasons which justify a moral code (from the Greek term for learned behavior, ), then a morality can be unethical even if it is popular, as sometimes people may choose an unethical moral code. Witness, for example, the moralities of certain groups or even whole nations in the past which may be interpreted to have been unethical (such as, the morality of Nazi Germany). If by "morality" is meant the accepted view of good conduct within a specific social group, then a theory of ethics can't be "moral" for a certain social group unless its implied rules of conduct have become the accepted code for that group, just as a game doesn't begin to be played unless those who learn about it decide to play it (see also chapter on Morality).
A non-accepted (as contrasted to an unacceptable) morality is for those who did not accept it as a moral possibility. Alternatively, a theory of ethics is rediscoverable every time one reads, listens to, or has an intuition about it.
Like the game-like nature of morality, so does the game-like nature of ethical theories makes them difficult to take "seriously." Ironically, the more seriously humans take any one ethical view, in the sense of becoming less willing to change it, the less capable they become, emotionally, to reinterpret the world in an ethical way. This is so because from a world perspective no one ethical perspective is really "ethical," but instead requires that the world is reinterpreted from a variety of ethical perspectives that humans can imagine other world parts might have about the world (=ethical perspectivism). A universal ethics requires that no world-part is denied its own ethical perspective, if not practicing morality, any more than is required for the world as a whole to discriminate among its world-parts to remain "worldly."
An ethical system that no one has subscribed to is no less ethical for that reason alone, than one that enjoys wide popularity. An ethics that exists only in theory is potentially just as "potent," as one that is presently widely accepted. We refer to a theory's strength as-theory as its "theoreticality." Such "theoreticality" allows us to stitch all ethical theories together over time, no matter how outdated, unethical, impractical, or undesirable such theories may presently seem. This is so because one need not first apply an ethical system to describe it, any more than she must justify theoretically a moral code to continue to practice it. And just as one can imagine, contrive, or borrow an ethical theory, no matter how old or impractical, so she can simulate, role-play, or pretend to practice the imaginable morality of other world parts.
Seen from the perspective of the world as a whole, it may be more fair that sometimes there is no "fairness," if by fairness is meant strictly this or that culture-bound or even human-bound interpretation of fairness, than that the world as a whole is saddled with a human-centered conception of "fairness." What may be "fair" from a human perspective, may not be from the perspective of the world as a whole, or other animate or inanimate world-parts. For example, while from a Marxist perspective it may be considered "fair" that natural resources are equally distributed among all ethnic or cultural groups within a certain society, it may be unethical even to begin such distribution if it means the possible elimination of another world-part-category (such as, a certain bird species). Humans come closer to knowing "ethics" from the world's perspective as they reinterpret even themselves on the basis of universal first assumptions, even if at times such assumptions most people in their own society may consider "unethical."
The interdependence of the universe's parts may be seen as a type of universal "egalitarianism." This is so because from a universal perspective, no part is more world than another, and therefore more "valuable" as-world than another. Consequently, all parts are equally "valuable" to the world, since all world parts equally make the world what it is.
The world's (=universe's) egalitarianism is also its version of universal justice: no one part is allowed for long to destroy other world parts without falling victim to its own destructiveness. This is so because by destroying other parts, it destroys those "destructible" world-parts which make it be, or else they wouldn't be destructible. By "destructible" here we mean those parts on whose existence the destructive world-part can have an effect, or else it couldn't rise as "destructive" (nor would the destroyed world-parts be "destructible"). In other words, seen from the perspective of the "destroyer," destroyed world parts are "destructible" precisely because they have a connection with the destroyer that makes it possible for such destroyer to destroy them. Since no world-part can exist in a vacuum, a destructive world-part that turns on its destructible world-connections, turns on itself. A destructive world-part "burns" its bridges to its universal existence as part-interdependent.
In human terms, universal "punishment" is the destruction that a destructive world-part inflicts on itself by destroying other world parts. This is the universe's way of meting out punishment on destructive world-parts, or, more correctly, the destructive world part's fulfillment of its other-than-present possibilities. Of course from a universal perspective, there are no "destructive" world parts, nor "punishment," nor, finally, is any "destroyed" world part really destroyed (since it wasn't there as a completely separate part, to start with); there is only the constant fulfillment of world possibilities, some of which may be destroyed-in-the-present, but may re-appear in some similar form in the future.
If destroyer-turned-destroyed world parts re-appear, they may no longer be destructive, in the same sense of "destructive" they had in their earlier existence. This is so because it would no longer be the same universe , and therefore the conditions that allowed such parts to destroy others may no longer exist. In fact, for such parts to re-appear, they would require the cooperation of their interdependent world-part-cousins to allow them to re-appear. A good example of this cooperative interdependence may be glimpsed from evolution on planet earth, where it can be shown that earth-bound parts evolved as a result of their adaptability to their environment. In other words, there is the presumption of an environment conducive to the continued existence or "emergence" of world parts, in the first place. This leads us to speculate that as a result of such cooperative relationship, such newly emergent or re-emergent world parts would have established strong enough emergence-dependent connections with the rest of the world to be less likely to destroy them (otherwise, why emerge?). This cycle of cooperative emergence or re-emergence of world parts , or, alternatively, the destruction of destructive ones, continues until world parts fall harmoniously in line with the "life cycles" of the rest of the universe.
Sensing the mathematical balance of universal punishment, several religious prophets, clairvoyants, and mystics proclaimed the same type of punishment or "retribution" in human affairs. For example, they warn against doing evil, as the evildoer eventually will be punished for his wrongdoings (by god, otherworldly spirits, or returning judges). In popular culture, this is perceived to mean some sort of after-death judgement. From a world perspective, punishment is a form of self-return or "retribution" which the destructive world-part caused itself to suffer. This doesn't mean that all destruction in the universe is retribution, since then there would be no destruction suffered, but only destruction done, which would make it impossible that anything is ever destroyed. What is meant is that destruction, by which we mean the destruction of world-part possibilities, eventually takes down both perpetrator and sufferer. In true Sartrean form, it is this mutuality which determines the future of the universe, and which makes every world-part, including humans, "condemned to be free." Simply put, they are free either to be human, by universalizing their interpretation-dependent actions(="praxis"); or cease to exist as human through their destructive actions, and thus help a non-human world part survive through their non-existence.
1. See also chapter on Morality. Return
to Contents
| Return to the
Top
|
Since March 6,2006
page has been visited ...
Teak Bench |
Academic Home Page
|
